the earth are the *Ap* world. He thought,
"(There are these worlds;
Shall I send forth guardians of the world ?
He then formed a person,
taking him forth from the water ".

The close is similar in spirit to that of the Mundaka description.

"When *born i.e.,* when the Highest Self had entered the body
as the individual self. He looked through all things in order to see
whether anything wished to proclaim here another self. He saw
this Person only *i.e.,* Himself as the widely-diffused Brahman and
he said ^c< I saw it".

The description of creation given in the first chapter
of Brihadaranyaka, though very fanciful, is identical in spirit with those given above. The description given in the Chandogya by Rishi Aruni, already abstracted above, is
far more significant and yet he is an absolute monist.

On the above accounts of creation, Tattwabhushan makes the following illuminating observations:—

ft It will be seen that however mysterious a thing creation may
be, however difficult it may be to conceive its real nature, the writers
of the Upanishads all believe in its reality. They indeed never lose
sight of the principle that in creation nothing was produced that was
apart from Brahman, nothing that constituted a real duality. But
that there has been a change in some sense or other, or <to be more
exact, that change in one sense or other is real, in the sense of being
an object of the Divine knowledge, an effect of the Divine power,—
of this the founders of Hindu Theism seem, to have not the slightest
doubt. It is true that *Svetasvam URanishad is* the only one of th&

twelve principal Upanishads that calls
nature by the significant name
of *Maya.* But except using this much
misunderstood term, the writer
of this Upanishad says nothing as to the
unreality of nature, but is
throughout his description of creation as
realistic as the writers of
the other Upanishads. Belief in creation
or change, it (the Maya
theory) says, is due to ignorance. Well,
this ignorance 'must belong
to a finite being. This finite being,
therefore whether he be a man,
a god or the great Hiranyagarbha
himself, must first be created in
order that his ignorance may be possible.
His creation would therefore
be a change not due to his or any one
else's ignorance, but a fact re-
lated to the divine knowledge itself. Even
if the finite being con-
ceived were supposed to be co-eternal
with, though dependent on